Combat operations require highly responsive and agile forces with capabilities tailored to meet the needs of a JFC. These capabilities must be ready at the right place at the right time to meet operational objectives. They must be delivered with maximum efficiency in the smallest footprint with the least amount of tail to preserve limited resources. To ensure this priorities are established and risk is incurred in the development of a sequence for arriving combat and support forces. During a crisis response, planners must make extremely quick assessments and assumptions concerning operating locations, local conditions, and required support functions to develop proposed courses of action for the Commander. These assumptions and the subsequent sequence of deployment by functions incur operational risk to forces, deployment efficiency, and the eventual effectiveness of a selected course of action. Operational planners must have a comprehensive picture of the operational area and a high degree of functional expertise in order to accurately assess the risk of sequencing combat forces in relation to combat support elements. Combat support functions enable combat power. Deploying tooth at the expense of tail risks degradation of total combat power and an increase of deployment inefficiency.
Preface
The topic for this paper was inspired by leaders embroiled in current events and the daily effort to support combat power and national interests in the Afghanistan AOR. They are facing the same challenges and obstacles that have been overcome in every U.S. deployment since the Gulf War.
No issue or comment in this paper should be implied to be a failure or criticism of operational planning staffs at any level of Service. This paper is intended only to raise the issue of risk management with the goal of improving operational efficiency. While the paper centers on combat support for air operations, lessons learned and recommendations can be applied to the forward deployment of forces in all Services. My research has revealed that the concerns of sequencing forces deployed to forward locations are more prevalent in the Air Force and Army where tough decisions have to be made about priorities in consideration of timing for combat power deployment and the limited amount of strategic airlift. U.S. Navy and Marine combat support elements benefit from consolidation afloat and movement en masse to a forward location.
For security purposes and host nation sensitivities, I do not specify locations in the account of incidents affecting current operations. Many of the details including operational impacts are classified. Therefore, in order to preserve an unclassified paper, I can only provide the general nature of the incidents.
I am indebted to members of the U.S. Air Force Civil Engineering Contingency Cell, the U.S Navy N-4, and U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs J-4 staff for allowing me the opportunity to hear their perspectives, despite the extremely intense operations tempo they are experiencing.
"Lead, follow, or get the hell out of the way"-USAF RED HORSE Motto ii CINCCENT responded in the first days of Operation DESERT SHIELD with a course of action intended to deter and defend against an Iraqi attack into Saudi Arabia. The objective was to quickly set a trip wire of iron on runways and shooters in the way of Iraqi armored columns, weighing the operational risks of mismatched forces and lack of combat support against the risk of losing crucial ports and infrastructure. The 82 nd Airborne began arriving in Dhahran the day after the deployment order. Air Force F-15s also arrived in country on the same day to start air patrols. Despite the confusion, as we now know, it worked.
It worked because we had the most lethal military force in the world, extensive support from our host nation, and an extremely cooperative enemy, who either had no intentions for Saudi Arabia or whose military incompetence precluded another Task Force Smith. Much analysis has been conducted in the last ten years over the first two weeks of Desert Shield, concluding that the commander's estimate of the situation drove the initial sequence and types of forces deployed. But, should the quick, decisive deployment of substantial tooth with minimal sustaining tail serve as a model course of action to pursue in the face of an aggressive enemy?
"The basic problem we were dealing with was that we were trying to set up a logistical structure for reception in the middle of a deployment. According to doctrine and common sense, you set up the structure first and only then do you begin the deployment." 2 Will "tooth first" continue to be an effective deterrent to an adversary with knowledge of our capabilities, an assessment of our vulnerabilities, and the will to act upon both? Would our soldiers and airmen have been able to sustain a fight without the flexibility, maneuverability, and combat support they were trained to rely on? 3 Should planners continue to count on the ingenuity of field leadership and the continued unwavering dedication of our personnel to ensure success in every mission despite substantial obstacles?
A leaner, more lethal force structure emerged from the Gulf. 
Operational Risk in Deployments
Defining risk as both the probability and severity of loss linked to hazards, risk management in force deployment decisions does not impose the possibility of ultimate mission failure. Risk assessment in this case focuses on a lesser degree of severity: the probabilities of an increase in the time needed to employ power; the sacrifice of flexibility; and an increased threat of loss of life or injury. In deployment planning, two areas of risk are analyzed: the selection of secure operating locations and the sequence of forces to arrive at that location, both affecting the initial operating capability date. Operational risk incurred within a selected course of action can be compounded by a risk of faulty assumptions stemming from partial information leading to the selection. Thus, unforeseen conditions or inadequate crisis planning magnify the risk inherent in deployment sequencing. , II-5 10 Lt Gen Horner JFACC "Initially, our biggest problems from a logistics standpoint were munitions, fuels, and bare base…but these were caused by the speed with which our fighter units deployed. We began the deployment under the auspices of one plan, …within the first day we switched to a second plan...and then abandoned all previously developed contingency plans and constructed one as we went along." Gulf War Air Power Survey, 221
"Logistics is the strong basement structure on which the Air Force house is built." -Gen Benjamin Chidlaw, USAF lessons learned about poor site selection, deployment inefficiencies, and operational vulnerabilities incurred by an incomplete pre-deployment assessment or a lack of adequate support functions to respond to different or changing site conditions.
Lessons Learned from Sequencing of Deployments
Lessons were drawn from database searches of past operations and interviews with staff functions involved with current operations to ascertain trends that might be of assistance for planners in future operations. In these lessons field leadership noted local challenges and
conditions not applicable in all operations. Most of these operations benefited from some degree of deliberate planning (defined as planning accomplished more than 5 days before Dday) more advanced that that allotted planners for DESERT SHIELD. Most were conducted in less mature theaters than Southwest Asia. These operations also were conducted without the threat of imminent attack by a substantial enemy force. Lessons were drawn from a full range of operations from combat support to humanitarian missions. Three basic issues characterize the resulting trend analysis:
1. Lack of functional expertise required for safe operations and force protection 2. Lack of sufficient planning and/or information leading to inefficient deployments
Unforeseen conditions disrupting effective deployment execution
Although none of these conditions noted resulted in loss of life, they were submitted and validated in order to point out unsafe or inefficient operations that, given the wrong set of circumstances or an aggressive adversary, might have resulted in tragedy. They represent the type of risks that might not be readily apparent in the large scheme of operational planning.
Each case was the result of inefficient planning, oversight, or a deliberate decision to prioritize combat equipment ahead of combat support despite the operational constraints imposed by the omission in terms of deployment efficiency and or need for operational flexibility.
Force Protection
Engineers provide force protection capabilities to a commander in an expeditionary environment ranging from explosive ordnance disposal to fire fighting and rescue activities.
They also implement defensive measures including secure siting, assembly, and hardening of facilities used for force beddown. A primary responsibility for the first engineers deployed, learned from past losses and successes, 11 is to protect high value resources by building revetments, berms and barriers. A major role for Air Force military engineers is to coordinate chemical/biological defense and decontamination efforts. Force protection also extends to the assurance of a safe water supply. Given these force protection responsibilities, the deployment of combat power into a location with an unknown or even minimal threat of attack, without the capability to protect the force, exponentially increases the risk to forces.
In the initial days of DESERT SHIELD, Gen Pagonis noted a force protection nightmare of nagging concerns persist about the additional risk incurred by field commanders in areas of: In all, operational planners must remain cognizant of the risk to the ability of commanders to protect forces incurred by the delay or omission of key military engineering functions from the first deployment stages.
Effective Deployment Execution
The second area of risk incurred is the delay in initial operating capability due to incomplete plans or the disruption of the flow of forces into an expeditionary environment. While not as severe a risk to operational success as force protection, the risk of inefficiency puts substantial strain on limited lift resources and limited time as illustrated in the Gulf War. 
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In many cases, flow of combat power has been interrupted to correct discrepancies in the balance of combat support elements. The absence of critical airfield support skills in previous operations threatened to halt strategic airlift operations. 26 In a classic Catch-22, equipment needed to facilitate the deployment of combat forces was "out-prioritized" by the need to deploy combat forces. Another strain on strategic airlift affecting deployment efficiency is the continued perpetuation of "the logistics snowball" originally described in theory in 1959 27 and later verified in practice in 1990.
"Because CINCENT decided to deploy combat units ahead of logistics support and sustainment cargo, CENTCOM did not allocate airlift resources to channel operations…. Consequently, backlogs of sustainment cargo routinely built up at CONUS aerial ports. Compounding the problem was the fact that cargo caught in
24 Gulf War Air Power Survey, 4 25 ibid, 125 26 In Joint Endeavor: "Observation: All required forward operating base flight line support equipment was not in place when airlift operations commenced. Lesson Learned: Aircraft on runway needing a tow or deice, could have shut down operations. Lack of ability to clear snow from runways could have shut down operations. Recommended action: Ensure priority of flight line infrastructure is high and in place prior to airfield operations commencing. Comments: Priority of equipment movement into B-H was determined by theater CINC. Some support equipment was "out-prioritized" by combat equipment." -JULLS 11441-62300, 14 Jan 96 27 "If the logistics aspects of an operation are initially planned and provided on a seriously inadequate scale, experience has shown that the eventual commitment of logistical resources to that operation, in an effort to correct the initial deficiencies, will be lavish and wasteful. In other words, under-planning produces over-planning… The problem of the relative build-up of combat forces versus logistic forces is largely a problem of personnel; and inefficient personnel is the single greatest source of the "logistics snowball". (Eccles p 52.) the backlogs was often assumed lost and subsequently reordered."
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In ENDURING FREEDOM the lack of adequate surveys or advance deployment teams to locations never previously considered for operations has resurrected the same dilemma of under-estimated airlift requirements as was noted in the first few days of DESERT SHIELD.
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Despite vast improvements in transit visibility since the Gulf War, the absence of a logistics team in place to receive and distribute equipment and material accompanying combat forces will eventually increase the total requirement for airlift resources. Another requirement levied on intra-theater lift has been the movement of personnel from one forward location to another to compensate for inadequate flow into the theater. In current operations critical skill engineers have had to be transported between forward locations to ensure safe operations. A balanced sequence of incoming forces places the right personnel in the right place at the right time and can improve overall efficiency while reducing the risk of combat power employment.
Assessing Courses of Action
The commander's assessment of the situation, to include analysis of conditions, commander's intent, and the identification of governing factors, is an essential part of the planning process 28 Gulf War Air Power Survey, 302 29 "As a result of requirements uncertainty, estimated airlift requirements for the first seven deploying units increased by sixty percent between 11 and 13 Aug" The increase forced the Command to schedule more sorties than originally planned for those units and to delay airlift for follow-on units."-Gulf War Air Power Survey, 83
"But in its relation to strategy, logistics assumes the character of a dynamic force, without which the strategic conception is simply a paper plan" -Commodore C. Given the range of responsibilities assigned to a commander in a contingency, the risk of an inefficient operation or a potential incident due to a missing function might not rate high on the "CINC concern" meter. A situation constrained by resources and time demands that cost/benefit trade-offs be assessed very quickly at all levels of planning. So what is the risk of deploying support functions ahead of combat power? CINC staffs would be faced with similar issues of force protection, the probability of a delay in the date of initial operating capability, and a threat to the achievement of objectives. Immediate force protection concerns can be most pressing in the time between the first arrival of forces and the closure of combat capability. This window of vulnerability would be extended by the introduction of support functions first into an expeditionary location. As to delays in capability, CINC's want to know the day they can employ effects. The later that capability date, the greater risk to satisfaction of objectives and the greater the pressure on components to make deployments priorities. The ability to affect the enemy must be the top priority over efficiency and flexibility.
In a hostile environment, security is the first requirement for an expeditionary location and dominates deployment priorities. This is why assault forces such as the 82 nd Airborne and These questions get back to the need for a comprehensive risk assessment and the commander's intent.
"A little neglect may breed mischief; for want of a nail, the shoe was lost; for want of a shoe, the horse as lost; for want of a horse, the rider was lost." -Benjamin Franklin
Recommendations
A crisis response plan should be as efficient and comprehensive as possible to maintain the attention and effort of fielded forces at a forward location towards employing power and expanding capabilities to respond to new situations. Each lesson learned, from thousands of airborne troop around an exposed runway threatened by an enemy nearby to forward personnel rife with sickness through the local water supply, represents a vulnerability that may eventually be used against us by a willing enemy. Over the past twenty years, more U.S military personnel have died from enemy and terrorist attacks against sustainment facilities and operations, (i.e.
barracks, recreation facilities, replenishment) as have occurred during combat operations.
These recommendations are intended to contribute to a comprehensive risk assessment process to analyze and select the best courses of action the first time. While they focus on the roles of military engineers, they can be applied to the entire spectrum of logistical support. The goal should be the application of logistical expertise and training across all operational planning and execution phases to provide a breadth and depth of combat support to the CINC. 
Training and Expertise

From
Commander's Intent
While future operations may require the quick decisive deployment of combat power to deter or defend against an attack, not every situation will require the forty-eight hour 44 Observation from Gulf War: "CENTAF contracting began to deploy contingency contracting officers ….one or two days before the arrival of incoming units. These personnel established blanket Purchase agreements for [many services and items available] on the local economy. Such foresight helped keep airlift assets concentrated on supplying units with warfighting capabilities…" Gulf War Airpower Survey, 57 45 Maj General Brady commanding the 16 th Aerospace Expeditionary Task Force in Kosovo observed "A thorough analysis of the deployed location and the organizations as well as the people and equipment required to support operations, is the first step in a successful operation. And this important analysis will require close communication among the deploying unit, the unit's major command and the theater air component…. The Commander should proceed to the expeditionary base as soon as possible. This is extremely important in expeditionary operations, particularly when base operating support is not available and there are no US host units to establish relationships with host nation officials. We gained a distinct advantage by have him (4 AEW Commander) arrive well before the aircraft. It allowed time…to begin discussions on some of the more important issues of force protection, contracting with local vendors, and so forth. In addition, early arrival gives the commander time to focus on all the important aspects of base operating support before operations begins... Lessons Learned: we need to formally establish the process by which we determine the make-up of units being deployed to expeditionary locations. Even though commanders should retain the authority to form their units, the theater air component is best positioned to advise commanders in what resources are available at deployed locations and what should be brought forward from CONUS. More definitive guidance in War Mobilization Plans volumes and exercise predeployment discussions with the theater air components are both required to ensure the best use of limited lift resources and more effectively manned and equipped expeditionary units. wants the capability to respond to a changing environment. For both, a comprehensive risk assessment should include a probability with a high degree of assurance on a range of questions ranging from the threat to anticipated follow-on missions. Table 2 (page 29) provides a general framework of the factors to be assessed. The higher the probability of the requirement or the even higher the degree of uncertainty about the requirement should drive a need for either further investigation or the deployment of support elements first to establish a clear understanding of the environment in which we will deploy combat power. A commander should know the full range and extent of possible hazards his decisions will impose upon his forces to ensure adherence with his intent. 46 As quoted by Pagonis, 81. "Balance between Combat Forces and Logistics Forces. 
